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Abstract—In this letter, the secrecy performance of a mixed
free space optics (FSO) and radio frequency (RF) system is
analyzed from physical layer security (PHY) perspective. In this
scenario, one or more eavesdroppers are trying to intercept the
confidential signal in a mixed FSO/RF system. The faded FSO
links are modeled by Ma´laga (M) distribution and RF link is
characterized by Nakagami-m distribution. Exact closed form
expressions for secrecy performance metrics such as secrecy
outage probability and strictly positive secrecy capacity are
derived and analyzed for the proposed system in terms of Fox’s
H-function. Furthermore, the asymptotic expressions for these
performance metrics are analyzed. Finally, all the results are
verified by Monte-Carlo simulations.
Index Terms—Physical layer security (PHY), Mixed FSO/RF,
Ma´laga, Nakagami-m, secrecy outage probability (SOP), strictly
positive secrecy capacity (SPSC).
I. INTRODUCTION
PHYSICAL Layer Security and protection have progres-sively become issues of interest in wireless communi-
cation network [1-9]. Wireless communication is more vul-
nerable to eavesdropping because of its broadcast nature. An
enormous amount of classified and sensitive data e.g. budget
information, client documents, military information, healthcare
records, etc. are transmitted by means of wireless channel.
The inherent openness of wireless medium permits anyone
inside the scope to track the signal, which makes the data
security one of the most critical and troublesome issues in
wireless systems. Traditionally the data security is handled
by cryptographic approach (used in Application layer (layer
7), network layer (layer 3), and data-link layer (layer 2))
[2]. Generally, cryptographic approach is based on the data
encryption method. Because of advancement in breaking of
encrypted algorithms, this method is always vulnerable for se-
curity. Subsequently, new security approaches are incorporated
based on the information theory fundamentals i.e. focusing on
the secrecy capacity of the channel. This is termed as physical
layer security (PHY) and it is handled in the physical layer
[3-7]. PHY solution is basically achieved by using different
methods such as code based, signalling based, and physical
layer encryption based methods.
Many researchers put their effort to analyze the secrecy
performance from RF perspective by analyzing the secrecy
performance for various fading channels. The performance
of a wiretap channel was first introduced by Wyner [1] in
which a source is trying to communicate with the destination
in the presence of an external eavesdropper. Based on the
nature of the propagation channel, researchers focused on
various fading distributions to mitigate the piracy such as:
generalized K [2], α-µ [3], generalized Gamma [4] etc. On the
other side due to channel scattering, atmospheric turbulence,
pointing deflection and optical beam divergence [5], there is
a possibility of eavesdropping of confidential data. Therefore
authors in [6] pointed out the data eavesdropping due to optical
beam divergence and turbulence effect. The analysis in [6]
also concludes that a eavesdropper can be able to overhear
the data if it is very close to the legitimate node. Then in [7],
it is investigated that the information can be overheard from
outside the laser beam converging area through an non-line
of sight (NLOS) scattering channel. In [8] it is highlighted
that the eavesdropping also possible, if the beam is reflected
by a small particle or blocked by a suitable obstacle. Then
some efforts have been devoted to analyze the FSO link from
PHY perspective such as: in [8], authors explore the PHY for
a FSO channel characterized by Ma´laga (M) distribution and
analysed the secrecy outage probability (SOP), strictly positive
secrecy capacity (SPSC) and average secrecy capacity (ASC)
as a performance metrics.
Moreover, the research was extended for cooperative re-
laying based approach to achieve the secure communication
[9]. Such relaying approach is mainly used in mixed FSO/RF
environments to get the benefits of FSO to the end user
level. Authors in [10] considered a mixed RF/FSO (uplink)
environment by analysing the performance metrics such as:
SOP and ASC, where the RF link is modeled by Nakagami-
m distribution and FSO link is characterized by Gamma-
Gamma (GG) distribution. During analysis the eavesdropper is
considered to be located in th RF link, modelled by Nakagami-
m distribution. Furthermore, in [11], the outage probability,
average symbol error rate, channel capacity and intercept
probability for a mixed RF/FSO system were analysed from
RF security perspective. Similarly in [12], the PHY analysis is
done for a hybrid satellite-FSO co-operative system where the
satellite link is modelled by the shadowed Rician distribution
and FSO link is assumed to be Gamma-Gamma fading distri-
bution. Security analysis was further extended for downlink
RF/FSO system i.e. FSO/RF system in [13]. The FSO/RF
system has the advantage to serve multiple RF users with
different data rates [14]. However, reported works in RF/FSO
and FSO/RF scenarios are limited to the secrecy performance
analysis for the RF side eavesdroppers only. This motivates to
explore the PHY performance for a FSO/RF system, where
an optical eavesdropper at relay is trying to interrupt the
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2communication. The main contributions of this work are:
1) So far no literature on PHY analysis is available in
the context of information overhearing from RF based
eavesdropper as well as FSO based eavesdropper si-
multaneously in a mixed FSO/RF system. More specif-
ically during analysis, we have considered the worst
case scenario by assuming that the confidential data is
intercepted in each hop of the system i.e. eavesdroppers
are trying to intercept the signal from FSO as well as
RF links simultaneously.
2) The closed form expressions for secrecy performance
metrics such as SOP and SPSC in wide range of fading
severity (i.e. moderate, and strong regions) is derived
under the impact of pointing error and different FSO
data detection methods.
3) The SOP and SPSC expressions are obtained in terms
of Meijer’s-function and bivariate Fox’s H-function (i.e.
EGBFHF).
4) Further, the derived closed form results are expressed
asymptotically to validate the proposed work and finally
all the results are validated through Monte-Carlo simu-
lation.
II. SYSTEM AND CHANNEL MODELS
A mixed FSO/RF wireless scenario is considered in which
the source (S) transmits its private data to the legitimate
destination node (D) through a trusted relay (R). During
transmission, two unauthorized receivers (E1 and E2) are
trying to decode the data using a photo detector at the relay
and a RF antenna at the destination respectively. In this model,
the FSO Link-1 (i.e. S–R) and FSO Link-2 (i.e. S–E1) are
assumed to follow Ma´laga (M) distribution. The relay is
connected to the destination through a RF link that is modelled
by Nakagami-m distribution. The channel between relay and
eavesdropper (E2) is also assumed to follow the Nakagami-
m distribution. A decode and forward (DF) based relay is
considered that decodes the incoming signal and retransmits
to the destination. The relay has a photo detector to receive
the optical signal from the source and has a RF antenna to
retransmit the RF signal to the destination.
The probability density function (PDF) and the cumula-
tive distribution function (CDF) of the instantaneous SNR
(γSk; k ∈ {R,E1}) for Ma´laga fading channels are expressed
as [15]
fγSk(γ) =
Aξ2
2rγ
β∑
m=1
bmG
3,0
1,3
B(γ
µ r
) 1
r
∣∣∣∣∣ ξ2 + 1ξ2, α,m
 , (1)
FγSk(γ) =
Aξ2
2r(2pi)r−1
β∑
m=1
cmG
3r,1
r+1,3r+1,
[
E
γ
µ r
∣∣∣∣∣ 1,K1K2, 0
]
,
(2)
where r = 1 and r = 2 represents the aver-
age SNR for heterodyne (HD) and intensity modulation
with direct detection (IM/DD) techniques respectively with
µ1 = γSk and µ2 =
ξ2(1+ξ2)
−2
(2+ξ2)(g+Ω′)
α−1(1+α)[2g(g+2Ω′)+Ω′2(1+ 1β )]
γSk.
A = 2α
α
2
g1+
α
2 rΓ(α)
(
gβ
gβ+Ω′
)β+α2
, B =
ξ2αβ
(
g+Ω
′)
(ξ2+1)(gβ+Ω′)
,
bm = am
[
αβ
gβ+Ω′
]−α+m2
, cm = bmrα+m−1, am =(
β − 1
m− 1
) (
gβ+Ω
′)1−m2
(m−1)!
(
Ω
′
g
)m−1 (
α
β
)m
2
, E = B
r
r2r . The
parameter α is a positive number related to effective number
of large scale cells of the scattering process, and β shows the
fading severity of the channel. From [15], g = 2b0 (1− ρ),
denotes the average power of the scattering component re-
ceived by off-axis eddies, 2b0 is the average power of the total
scattering components. The parameter ρ denotes amount of
scattering power coupled to the line-of-sight (LOS) component
with 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1, Ω′ = Ω+2b0ρ+2
√
2b0ρΩcos (φA − φB) rep-
resents the average power from coherent contributions, Ω is the
average power of the LOS component, and φA and φB are the
deterministic phases of the LOS and the coupled-to-LOS scat-
ter items, respectively [15]. Parameter r represents the scheme
of detection at the photo receiver. ξ is the measure of pointing
deflection between transmitter and receiver. γSk and γRD
are the electrical and average SNRs for the respective links.
K1 =
[
∆
(
r, ξ2 + 1
)]
, K2 =
[
∆
(
r, ξ2
)
,∆ (r, α) ,∆ (r,m)
]
where ∆ (x, y) = yx ,
y+1
x , ...,
y+x−1
x , G
m,n
p,q [.] is the Meijer’s
G function [16, Eq. (9.301)], and Γ(.) is the Gamma function
[16, Eq. (8.310)].
The faded RF link is assumed to experience a Nakagami-
m distribution [17]. The PDF and CDF for the instantaneous
SNR (γRj ; j ∈ {D,E2}) can be written as follows
fγRj (γ) =
(
mRj
γRj
)mRj γ(mRj−1)
Γ (mRj)
exp
(
−mRjγ
γRj
)
, (3)
FγRj (γ) = 1−
m−1∑
k=0
1
k!
(
mΘγ
γRD
)k
exp
(
−mΘγ
γRD
)
. (4)
For a DF based relaying network, the end-to-end SNR can
be written as γeq = min (γSR,γRD) [17]. From [17], the CDF
for γeq is obtained as
Fγeq (γ) = 1− Pr [γSR > γ] Pr [γRD > γ] . (5)
Using Eq.(1) and Eq.(3) in Eq.(4) and utilizing [18, Eq.
(07.34.21.0085.01)], the expression for end-to-end (S-R-D)
CDF is obtained as
Fγeq (γ) = 1−
Aξ22−r
(2pi)r−1
exp
(
−mRDγ
γRD
) (mRD−1)∑
k′=0
β∑
m=1
bm
r1−α−m
× (mRD − 1)
k′!Γ (mRD)
(
mRDγ
γRD
)k′
G3r+1,0r+1,3r+1,
[
Brγ
r2rµr
| 1,K1
K2, 0
]
.
(6)
III. EAVESDROPPING ATTACK ON FSO LINK ONLY
A. Secrecy outage probability analysis
SOP is one of the fundamental secrecy benchmarks, which
shows the level of privacy in any communication system.
It is defined as the probability that instantaneous secrecy
3SOPL1 = 1− (mRD−1)Γ(mRD)
(
ξ2A
2r
)2
1
(2pi)r−1
∑(mRD−1)
k′=0
(
mRDΘ
γRD
)k′
1
k′!
∑β1
m1=1
∑β2
m2=1
× rα+m1bm1bm2H0,1;3r+1,0;3,01,0;r+1,3r+1;1,3
[
υ1, υ2| (1; 1, 1)(−;−,−) |
(
K1, [1]k1
)
, (1, 1)(
K2, [1]k2
)
, (0, 1)
| (ξ
2 + 1, r)
(ξ2, r), (α, r), (m2, r)
]
. (9)
capacity (Cs) falls below a target secrecy rate [4] and it can
be expressed as
Pout (rs) = Pr {Cs (γeq, γSE) ≤ Rs} , (7)
where Rs is the target secrecy rate. Referring to [4], the lower
bound for the SOP is derived as
SOPL =
∫ ∞
0
Fγeq (Θγ) fγSE (γ) dγ. (8)
The expression of secrecy outage probability for FSO/RF
system can be expressed as given in (9) , where Θ = eRs ,
υ1 =
Br
µmRDr2r
, υ2 =
BrγRD
µγSEmSEΘ
, and [Q]i = Q,Q, ..., Q,
comprising i terms. Hm1,n1;m2,n2;m3,n3p1,q1;p2,q2;p3,q3 [.] is the H-function
of two variables, which can be efficiently implemented in
MATLAB [19].
Proof : See appendix A.
The SOP in Eq. (9) reduces to the SOP for Gamma-Gamma-
Rayleigh (for m = 1) special case as
SOPL1 = 1−
A2rα+β
(2pi)r−1
H1,0;3r+1,0;3,01,0;r+1,3r+1;1,3
×
Ξ1, Ξ2
∣∣∣∣∣ (1; 1, 1)(−;−,−)
∣∣∣∣∣
(
K
′
1, [1]k1
)
, (1, 1)(
K
′
2, [1]k2
)
, (0, 1)
∣∣∣∣∣ (ξ2 + 1, r)(ξ2, r), (α, r), (β, r)
 ,
(10)
where A = ξ
2
rΓ(α)Γ(β) , Ξ1 =
(hαβ)rγRD
γSRr
2r ,
Ξ2 =
(hαβ)rγRD
γSEΘ
, K
′
1 =
[
∆
(
r, ξ2 + 1
)]
and
K
′
2 =
[
∆
(
r, ξ2
)
,∆ (r, α) ,∆ (r, β)
]
.
At high SNR condition, γ →∞ i.e. Z →∞, the Meijer’s
G function expansion [15, Eq.41] is expressed as
lim
Z→∞
Gm,np,q
[
Z
∣∣∣∣∣ a1, ..., apb1, ..., bq
]
=
n∑
k=1
∏n
l=1;l 6=k Γ (ak − al)
∏m
l=1 Γ (1 + bl − ak)∏p
l=n+1 Γ (1 + al − ak)
∏q
l=m+1 Γ (ak − bl)
Zak−1.
(11)
Upon substituting Eq. (1) and Eq. (6) in Eq. (8) and applying
[18, Eq. (07.34.21.0013.01)] and Eq. (11), the asymptotic
expression of Eq. (8) can be expressed as
SOP∞L1 u
γ>>1
β1∑
m1=1
β2∑
m2=1
(
ξ2A
2r(2pi)r−1
)2
rα+m2−1cm1bm2
×
3r∑
k=1
(
γSR
γSEΘ
)K3,k−1 ∏3r
l=1;l 6=k Γ (K3,k −K3,l)∏4r+1
l=3r+1 Γ (1 +K3,l −K4.k)
×
∏3r+1
l=1 Γ (1 +K4,l −K3.k)∏4r+1
l=3r+2 Γ (K3,k −K4.l)
, (12)
where Ki,j denotes the jth term of Ki and
i ∈ {3, 4} with K3 = [1 − 4
(
r, ξ2
)
, 1 −
4 (r, α) , 1 − 4 (r,m1) , 1,4
(
r, 1 + ξ2
)
] and
K4 = [4
(
r, ξ2
)
,4 (r, α) ,4 (r,m2) , 0, 1−4
(
r, 2− ξ2)].
B. Strictly positive secrecy capacity analysis (SPSC)
SPSC shows the probability of existence of secrecy capacity.
It can be formulated as follows [2]
SPSC1 = Pr {Cs (γeq, γSE) > 0}
= 1− SOPL1 |RS=0. (13)
Upon substituting RS = 0 in (9) and then substituting in (13),
the SPSC can be expressed as Eq. (14), where υ
′
2 =
BrγRD
µγSEmSE
.
The SPSC in Eq. (14) can be approximated at high SNR as
SPSC∞1 u
γ>>1
1− SOP∞L |RS=0. (15)
Correspondingly, the asymptotic expansion for SPSC is
obtained as given in Eq. (16).
IV. EAVESDROPPING ATTACK ON BOTH FSO AND RF
LINKS SIMULTANEOUSLY
A. Secrecy Outage Probability (SOP)
For a DF based FSO/RF system, the instantaneous secrecy
capacity can be obtained as
CInst = min (CSR, CRD) < Rs. (17)
where, CSR and CRD are the instantaneous secrecy capacities
of SR and RD links respectively. Now the SOP in the presence
of two independent eavesdroppers can be computed as
SOP2 = Pr {min (CSR, CRD) < Rs}
= 1− Pr {CSR ≥ Rs}Pr {CRD ≥ Rs} . (18)
Further this can be reformulated as
SOP2 = 1−
(
1−
∫ ∞
0
FSR (ΘγSE1 + Θ− 1) fSE1 (γSE1) dγSE1
)
×
(
1−
∫ ∞
0
FRD (ΘγRE2 + Θ− 1) fRE2 (γRE2) dγRE2
)
(19)
As deriving the closed form of this SOP is very difficult,
therefore we can derive the lower bound as follows
SOPL2
∼= I1 × I2 (20)
4SPSC1 =
(mRD−1)
Γ(mRD)
(
ξ2A
2r
)2
1
(2pi)r−1
∑(mRD−1)
k′=0
(
mRDΘ
γRD
)k′
1
k′!
∑β1
m1=1
∑β2
m2=1
× rα+m1bm1bm2H0,1;3r+1,0;3,01,0;r+1,3r+1;1,3
[
υ1, υ
′
2| (1; 1, 1)(−;−,−) |
(
K1, [1]k1
)
, (1, 1)(
K2, [1]k2
)
, (0, 1)
| (ξ
2 + 1, r)
(ξ2, r), (α, r), (m2, r)
]
. (14)
SPSC∞1 u
γ>>1
∑β1
m1=1
∑β2
m2=1
(
ξ2A
2r(2pi)r−1
)2
rα+m2−1cm1bm2
×
3r∑
k=1
(
γ
γSE
)K3,k−1
×
∏3r
l=1;l 6=k Γ (K3,k −K3,l)∏4r+1
l=3r+1 Γ (1 +K3,l −K4.k)
×
∏3r+1
l=1 Γ (1 +K4,l −K3.k)∏4r+1
l=3r+2 Γ (K3,k −K4.l)
. (16)
SOPL2 =
[
1−
(
1−
(
Aξ2
2r(2pi)r−1
)2
$G3r+1,3r4r+3,4r+1,
[
γSR
ΘγSE1
∣∣∣∣∣ 1−K2, 1,K1K2, 0, 1−K1
])
× Λ
]
(23)
SOP∞L2 u
γ>>1
1−
{(
1−$
3r∑
k=1
(
γ
γSE1Θ
)K3,k−1 ∏3r
l=1;l 6=k Γ (K3,k −K3,l)∏4r+1
l=3r+1 Γ (1 +K3,l −K4.k)
×
∏3r+1
l=1 Γ (1 +K4,l −K3.k)∏4r+1
l=3r+2 Γ (K3,k −K4.l)
)
Λ
}
(24)
with
I1 = 1−
(
1−
∫ ∞
0
FSR (ΘγSE1) fSE1 (γSE1) dγSE1
)
(21)
and
I2 =
(
1−
∫ ∞
0
FRD (ΘγRE2) fRE2 (γRE2) dγRE2
)
(22)
Using (1) and (2) in (21) and (3) and (4) in (22) and
thereafter utilizing (12), the closed form expression for SOPL
is obtained as (23), where
Λ =
m−1∑
k=1
1
k!
(
mΘ
γRD
)k (
m
γRE2
)m
1
Γ (m)
Γ (m+ k)(
mΘ
γRD
+ mγRE2
)m+k
and
$ =
(
ξ2A
2r(2pi)r−1
)2 β1∑
m1=1
bm1r
α+m1−1
β2∑
m2=1
bm2r
α+m2−1
Proof : See appendix B.
Moreover using [15, Eq. (41)], the SOPL can be expressed
asymptotically at high SNR, as (24). with Ki,j denotes
the jth term of Ki and i ∈ {3, 4} with K3 = [1 −
4 (r, ξ2) , 1 − 4 (r, α) , 1 − 4 (r,m1) , 1,4 (r, 1 + ξ2)] and
K4 = [4
(
r, ξ2
)
,4 (r, α) ,4 (r,m2) , 0, 1−4
(
r, 2− ξ2)].
V. STRICTLY POSITIVE SECRECY CAPACITY ANALYSIS
SPSC shows the probability of existence of secrecy capacity.
It can be formulated as follows [2]
SPSC2 = Pr {Cs (γeq, γSE) > 0}
= 1− SOPL2 |RS=0. (25)
Using (23) in (25), we obtain the SPSC as (26), where
Λ
′
=
m−1∑
k=1
1
k!
(
m
γR1D
)k (
m
γR1E3
)m
Γ (m+ k)
Γ (m)
(
m
γR1D
+ mγR1E3
)m+k
The SPSC in Eq. (26) can be obtained at high SNR as
SPSC∞2 u
γ>>1
1− SOP∞L |RS=0. (27)
Thus using (24) in (27), we obtained the closed form expansion
for SPSC at high SNR as (28)
VI. NUMERICAL RESULT
In this part, the analytical and asymptotic results are pre-
sented to analyze the secrecy performance metrics. Further-
more, we analyze the impact of pointing deflection, type of
detection and, fading parameters of FSO and RF links on SOP
and SPSC. In this analysis, the secrecy rate is set to 0.01
nats/sec/Hz and m1 = m2 = m. The turbulence parameters
are considered as α = 2.296 and β = 2 for strong turbulence
region and, for moderate turbulence region the values are
α = 4.2 and β = 3.
Fig. 2 shows the SOP versus γRD for different values of
r, ξ, α and β. During analysis, the system is considered
to be attacked by FSO based eavesdropper in the first hop.
This figure reveals that the secrecy outage probability is
improved with increasing in γRD. It also concludes that the
heterodyne detection scheme leads better secrecy performance
than IM/DD scheme for different values of ξ. Moreover, the
high pointing accuracy (i.e. high value of ξ) leads to better
secrecy performance. From turbulence severity point of view,
larger value of α and β leads to better performance (i.e. smaller
SOP), since the severity of the atmospheric turbulence gets
lower. Fig. 3 demonstrates the effect of turbulence severity and
5SPSC2 =
[(
1−
(
Aξ2
2r(2pi)r−1
)2
$G3r+1,3r4r+3,4r+1,
[
γSR
γSE
∣∣∣∣∣ 1−K2, 1,K1K2, 0, 1−K1
])
Λ
′
]
(26)
SPSC∞2 u
γ>>1
{(
1−$
3r∑
k=1
(
γ
γSE1
)K3,k−1 ∏3r
l=1;l 6=k Γ (K3,k −K3,l)∏4r+1
l=3r+1 Γ (1 +K3,l −K4.k)
×
∏3r+1
l=1 Γ (1 +K4,l −K3.k)∏4r+1
l=3r+2 Γ (K3,k −K4.l)
)
Λ
′
}
(28)
Fig. 1. Secrecy outage probability versus average SNR with mRD = 2.
Fig. 2. Secrecy outage probability versus average SNR for Gamma-Gamma
special case with mRD = 1 and ξ = 1.1.
detection techniques on SOP for a high deflection of pointing
error. This figure is analysed for Gamma-Gamma special case.
This figure also results same as that for previous case (i.e. Fig.
2).
Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 show the SPSC versus γRD with same
parameter values used in the SOP analysis. The analysis is
also done for different detection schemes with wide range of
turbulence severity. These results reveal that the SPSC gets
better with increasing γRD. From Fig. 4, it is also observed
that high pointing accuracy and large value of α and β leads
better result for SPSC.
Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 depict the SOP as a function of R−D link’s
average SNR for r = 2 and r = 1. The curves are plotted by
considering simultaneous attack of two eavesdroppers in both
hops. All of these figures reveal that HD (r = 1)detection
scheme provides better result to that of IM/DD (r = 2). From
Fig. 3. Strictly positive secrecy capacity versus average SNR with mRD =
2.
Fig. 4. Strictly positive secrecy capacity versus average SNR for Gamma-
Gamma special case with mRD = 1 and ξ = 1.1.
turbulence severity point of view, it concludes that larger value
of α and β leads to better performance (i.e. smaller SOP),
since the severity of the atmospheric turbulence gets lower. As
shown in figures, Pointing deflection (ξ) plays a major role on
the system performance. The low value of ξ leads to worst
secrecy performance as there is a chance of optical power
received by the eavesdropper situated near the legitimate node.
Finally, for the results presented in Fig. 1 – Fig. 5, the
asymptotic results tightly approximate with the closed form
results. In the end, all the results are simulated through Monte-
Carlo method.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, the analysis is done for two different scenarios
such as: primarily it is assumed that an eavesdropper is
6Fig. 5. Secrecy outage probability versus average SNR (γRD(dB)) with
mRD = 2 and r = 2 in the presence of two Eavesdroppers.
Fig. 6. Secrecy outage probability versus average SNR (γRD(dB)) with
mRD = 2 and r = 1 in the presence of two Eavesdroppers.
attacking to FSO link only and secondly it is assumed that both
RF as well as FSO links are attacked by two eavesdroppers
simultaneously. The closed form expressions for SOP and
SPSC are derived in terms of bivariate Fox’s H-function and
Meijer’s G function. The impact of major parameters on the
overall secrecy performance are depicted. In addition, The
results show that low pointing error leads to better result for
the considered system. The detection method also influences
the performance i.e. HD scheme leads to better performance
as compared to the IM/DD scheme.
APPENDIX A
SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
Upon substituting Eq. (1) and Eq. (6) in Eq. (8), the integral
is obtained as follows
SOPL =
∫ ∞
0
(
1− exp
(
− Θγ
γRD
)
Aξ2
2r(2pi)r−1
×
β∑
m1=1
bm1r
α+m1−1G3r+1,0r+1,3r+1,
[
Brγ
r2rγSR
∣∣∣∣∣ 1,K1K2, 0
])
× Aξ
2
2rγ
β∑
m2=1
bm2G
3,0
1,3
[
B
(
γ
γSE
) 1
r
∣∣∣∣∣ ξ2 + 1ξ2, α,m2
]
dγ.
(A.1)
After mathematical simplification, Eq. (A.1) can further be
expanded as
SOPL = 1− Aξ
2
2r(2pi)r−1
Aξ2
2rγ
β∑
m1=1
bm1r
α+m1−1
β∑
m2=1
bm2
×
∫ ∞
0
γ−1 exp
(
− Θγ
γRD
)
G3r+1,0r+1,3r+1
[
Brγ
r2rγSR
∣∣∣∣∣ K1, 1K2, 0
]
×G3,01,3
[
B
(
γ
γSE
) 1
r
∣∣∣∣∣ ξ2 + 1ξ2, a, b
]
dγ. (A.2)
By expressing exp(.) and Gm,np,q [.] functions in their corre-
sponding H-function representations using the identity [17, Eq.
(07.34.26.0008.01)], the integral in terms of Fox’s H-functions
is obtained as
SOPL = 1− Aξ
2
2r(2pi)r−1
Aξ2
2rγ
β∑
m1=1
bm1r
α+m1
β∑
m2=1
bm2
∫ ∞
0
γ−1
×H1,00,1
[
Θγ
γRD
∣∣∣∣∣ −(0, 1)
]
H3r+1,0r+1,3r+1
[
Brγ
r2rγSR
∣∣∣∣∣
(
K1, [1]k1
)
, (1, 1)(
K2, [1]k2
)
, (0, 1)
]
×H3,01,3
[
Br
(
γ
γSE
) ∣∣∣∣∣ (ξ2 + 1, r)(ξ2, r), (a, r), (b, r)
]
dγ. (A.3)
Now, using the formula [15, Eq. (2.3)], Eq. (A.3) can be
expressed as Eq. (9).
APPENDIX B
DERIVATION OF I1 AND I2
In this appendix, we derive I1 and I2 as follows:
I1 = 1−
∫ ∞
0
FSR (ΘγSE1) fSE1 (γSE1) dγSE1 (B.1)
Herein we only solved the integral part of I1. Thus using (1)
and (2) in the above integral, the obtained expression is written
as
I1 = 1−$
∫ ∞
0
G3r,1r+1,3r+1,
[
Eγ
µSR
| 1,K1
K2, 0
]
×G3,01,3,
[
B
(
γ
µSR
) 1
r
∣∣∣∣∣ ξ2 + 1ξ2, α,m2
]
dγ (B.2)
By utilizing [ 17, Eq.(07.34.21.0013.01)] in the above integral,
we obtain the closed form solution for I1 as
I1 = 1−
(
Aξ2
2r(2pi)r−1
)2
$G3r+1,3r4r+3,4r+1,
[
γSR
ΘγSE1
∣∣∣∣∣ 1−K2, 1,K1K2, 0, 1−K1
]
(B.3)
Similarly, for I2 can be formulated as
I2 =
(
1−
∫ ∞
0
FRD (ΘγRE2) fRE2 (γRE2) dγRE2
)
(B.4)
Utilizing (3) and (4), the integral part of the can be written
as
I2 = 1−
∫ ∞
0
{
1−
m−1∑
k=0
1
k!
(
mΘγ
γRD
)k
exp
(
−mΘγ
γRD
)}
×
(
m
γRE
)m
γm−1
Γ (m)
exp
(
− mγ
γRE
)
dγ
7Thus utilizing
∫∞
0
xα−1 exp (−µx) dx = Γ(α)µα in the above
expression, the solved closed for expression is obtained as
I2 =
m−1∑
k=1
1
k!
(
mΘ
γRD
)k (
m
γRE
)m
1
Γ (m)
Γ (m+ k)(
mΘ
γRD
+ mγRE
)m+k
(B.5)
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